Over 40
countries and organizations endorsed the New Deal in 2011. They agreed to
a trial period, ending in December 2015 during which time national governments,
donors and civil society would seek to change not only their ways of working,
but also what they sought to achieve together.
So, what
progress has been made since the New Deal’s endorsement? The Monitoring
Report highlights three areas of progress. First, dialogue among leaders
in a number of capitals around the world has given a stronger common voice to
war-torn, aid-dependent governments at global meetings.
In Somalia, the New
Deal has helped to shape dialogue and partnership between Somalis and the donor
community – and to keep it on the international agenda more forcefully.
The combination of volatile politics, insecurity, and weak institutions can
easily lead to disjointed and fragmented donor support. So far, it
appears that the New Deal has helped to integrate issues and efforts than would
otherwise be the case.
The governments
of the Comoros Islands, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Solomon
Islands, and Timor Leste all started a conversation with their populations on
what puts them at risk of violent conflict. While results are mixed and
the quality of fragility assessments varies, they have stimulated a dialogue
where none previously existed on such sensitive topics.
However,
conflict in South Sudan – and some responses to government approaches displayed
last year by the populations in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the Ebola
outbreak – remind us of the sheer magnitude of the challenge lying before us to
promote positive state-society dynamics. This could take a generation to
achieve.
Second, the
donors reported a wide range of activities to make aid more globally
transparent. While this is a good start, g7+ countries remind us of the
need to ensure aid transparency, locally. Aid information needs to be
translated into local formats and systems, which are ideally part of local
planning / budgeting processes.
Third, the
donors have increasingly put their money into one “pot” instead of financing
separate, stand-alone projects in g7+ countries. Pooled funds help
national authorities to get a fuller picture of how much aid money they may
count on to meet their spending priorities. Such a fuller picture is
crucial to effective national planning, as well as to improving public trust in
government. Pooled funding of official development assistance in g7+
countries increased from 10.5% in 2011 to 23.6% in 2013.
Such progress
notwithstanding, there are indications that we are not seeing the “paradigm
shift” called for in the New Deal. For this to happen, national plans and
international resources need to be structured around the five peace-building
and state-building goals. We are not there yet; and this can take
years. That being said, there are three challenges that could be met with
concrete action by the end of the trial period.
First, politics
can be brought back to the New Deal. The engagement of top political
leaders in both g7+ and donor countries is crucial to drive the agenda for
change at the policy, institutional, and even staffing levels. Ministers
of finance / planning might also consider whether there is a need to reach out
to line ministries and civil society to agree on a way forward.
Likewise, leaders should consider agreeing on a few flagship initiatives
that go far and deep enough to fix some real problems in specific
countries. The New Deal needs more examples of collective action that can set
the narrative and bolster momentum across varying country contexts. In doing
so, development officials may need to reach out to foreign affairs and defense
colleagues. Paradoxically, the New Deal is dangerously close to becoming its
own “silo” within the world of development cooperation.
Second, national authorities, donors and civil society need to come together around core priorities… in a political sense. At present, too many “priorities” set by technocrats are chasing too few resources in most fragile states, despite good progress made in producing national plans and negotiating compacts.
Core priorities need to reflect a workable compromise between the interests and agendas of local power-holders whose cooperation is essential to advancing transition and avoiding a relapse into violent conflict. Such political dialogue and consensus building doesn’t have to be the reserve of “peace talks” and “peace accords”. Internationally-supported transitions need to take into account the messy reality of country politics in an active and ongoing way.
Third, the use of country systems needs to be viewed more as a default approach to providing international assistance. This doesn’t mean direct budget support necessarily. Rather, donors, NGOs and private firms need to be “incentivized” to seek out opportunities for using country systems, even in areas that may be counter-intuitive and risky. Together, stakeholders and partners should agree on what parts of the “country systems” can be used practically, where risks can be shared and mitigated effectively. For all three, dialogue at top levels will need to bolster collective action not only to achieve feasible results, but also inspiring examples to emulate post-2015.
Second, national authorities, donors and civil society need to come together around core priorities… in a political sense. At present, too many “priorities” set by technocrats are chasing too few resources in most fragile states, despite good progress made in producing national plans and negotiating compacts.
Core priorities need to reflect a workable compromise between the interests and agendas of local power-holders whose cooperation is essential to advancing transition and avoiding a relapse into violent conflict. Such political dialogue and consensus building doesn’t have to be the reserve of “peace talks” and “peace accords”. Internationally-supported transitions need to take into account the messy reality of country politics in an active and ongoing way.
Third, the use of country systems needs to be viewed more as a default approach to providing international assistance. This doesn’t mean direct budget support necessarily. Rather, donors, NGOs and private firms need to be “incentivized” to seek out opportunities for using country systems, even in areas that may be counter-intuitive and risky. Together, stakeholders and partners should agree on what parts of the “country systems” can be used practically, where risks can be shared and mitigated effectively. For all three, dialogue at top levels will need to bolster collective action not only to achieve feasible results, but also inspiring examples to emulate post-2015.
Yannick Hingorani
Peace and Conflict Advisor
OECD-DCD
The views expressed in our blogs remain those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views or policies of the OECD or its members
